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AGENCY-WORKMEN'S tOMPENSATIoN-ExCLtJSIVENESS OF REMEDY-INJURY NOT
CAUSING Dis. mrry.-The plaintiff was slightly injured in the course of his
employment and received a small sum, without formal proceedings, as compen-
sation. At the same time, however, a nerve was destroyed, resulting in perman-
ent impotency. Since the compensation act made no provision for injuries not
affecting earning power, this action was brought at common law for damages.
Held, that the plaintiff could not recover, since the remedies given by the statute
were exclusive of all others. Hyett v. Northwestern Hospital (192o, Minn.)
i8o N. W. 552.
The legislative intent, in enacting compensation acts, was undoubtedly to
abolish all existing causes of action for personal injuries suffered in the course
of employment, and to substitute therefor definite comtensation commensurate
with the loss of earning power. Peet v. Mills (1913) 76 Wash. 437, 136 Pac. 685.
Where the act does not provide compensation, there is no remedy. Next of kin to
whom the act gives no death benefits may be deprived of their former statutory
right of action. Shanahan v. Engineering Co. (igi6) 219 N. Y. 469, 114 N. E. 795.
Pain and suffering are no longer elements of actionable damage, but are risks of
the employment. See Sweeting v. Knife Co. (1g9g) 226 N. Y. 199, 2Ol, 123 N. E.
82, 83. The lost remedies are a part of the price that the employee has paid
for his right to compensation. Both employer and employee gained benefits and
made concessions. Bohlen- Some Problems under Workmen's Compensation
Laws (1919) 67 U. P. L. REv. 62, 64. Injuries that do not result in lost earn-
ing power and are not included in the compensation schedules give no right to
compensation under the act. Shinn'ick v. Clover Farms Co. (igi) i6p App.
Div. 236, 154 N. Y. Supp. 423. Disfigurement, which is usually of this class,
may, however, be so severe as to materially impair the ability to secure employ-
ment, and is then properly compensable. Ball v. Hunt [1912, H. L.] A. C. 496.
The act gives the compensation, not for the injury, but for the actual disability.
Jones v. Anderson (1914, H. L.) 8 B. W. C. C. 2. In a few jurisdictions the
acts specifically provide compensation for severe disfigurement. See (1919)
28 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 715. When the disfigurement could not be compensated
for under the act, it has been held that the injury did not come within the pur-
view of the act, and that a common law recovery, therefore, was allowable.
Shinnick. v. Clover Farms Co., supra. But this doctrine is restricted to those
cases where no disability whataoever is involved. Morris v. Muldoon (192o)
ipo App. Div. 689, i8o N. Y. Supp. 319. This point of view seems unjustifiable
under the New York act, which provides that the employer's liability, as pre-
scribed by the act, shall be exclusive and in place of any other liability whatso-
ever. Oklahoma also apparently recognizes this distinction. See Adams v.
Biscuit Co. (1917, Okla.) 162 Pac. 938, 946. The Louisiana statute, which declares
that the remedies therein granted for injuries for which compensation is pro-
vided are exclusive, has been construed to permit a common-law recovery for
disfigurement, silice the statute does not provide compensation for such an injury.
Boyer v. Box Co. (igi8) 143 La. 368, 78 So. 596. But this reasoning could
hardly be applied to the Minnesota act, which completely abolishes the right to
any other method, form, or amount of compensation than that provided. The
decision in the principal case seems clearly sound. In the few cases contra, the
desire to aid the injured employee appears to have prevailed over sound policy
and the evident intention of the compensation acts. As to the constitutionality




ADMiRALTY-CoLLISiONs-DEFENSE OF COMPULSORY PmoTAGE.-The steamers
Gothland and Alexander Shukoff collided in the Thames on Dec. 4, i916. Both
vessels were in charge of compulsory pilots. It appeared that the Gothland was
at fault, but her owners put in the defense of compulsory pilotage. Evidence was
offered to show that the captain and crew of the Gothland had not rendered the
pilot the proper assistance by keeping a sharp lookout and giving the pilot warn-
ing of the proximity of the Shukoff. Held, that the defence of compulsory
pilotage 'was not available, since the master and crew of the vessel had not
rendered proper assistance to the pilot, and this neglect contributed to the col-
lision. The Alexander Shukoff v. The Gothland [192i, H. L.] A. C. 216.
Most seaports require the taking of a licensed pilot on entering and leaving
port. N. Y. Laws 1882, ch. 410, sec. 2ii9; The Pilotage Act, I913, sec. II.
If the only penalty for failure to take a pilot is the payment of the fee, the
pilotage is not considered compulsory. Homer Ramsdell Trans. Co. v Cie. Gin.
Transatlantique (igor) 182 U. S. 406, 21 Sup. Ct. 831; The Dallington [19o3,
Adm.] P. 77. When in charge of a vessel the pilot exercises most of the func-
tions of the master of the vessel. Abbott, Merchant Ships and Seamen (i 4th ed.
xgoI) 301; Hughes, Admiralty (2d ed. 192o) 36. A pilot is not an insurer of
the safety of the vessel, but is under a duty to the owners to exercise the reason-
able skill and diligence of an expert and may be held liable for any damages the
owner may have to pay. Guy v. Donald (i9o7, C. C. A. 4th) 157 Fed. 527, 14
L. R. A. (r. s.) x14, note. Pilot associations have been held liable for the
negligence of a pilot furnished by them. The Thielbek (1917, C. C. A. 9th)
241 Fed. 209; but see Marsden, Collisions at Sea (Tth ed. gIg) io8 (English
rule). According to the rule long followed in England it was a good defense
to an action for damages for a collision that the vessel was in the charge of a
compulsory pilot, the theory being that no man should be held liable for the acts
of a servant whom he has no choice in employfng. The Maria (i839, Adm.)
r W. Rob. 95; The Halley (i867, P. C.) L. R. 2 A. C. 193, 2oi. This exemption
from liability has been recognized by statute in England. 52 Geo. III., c. 39,
sec. 30 (1812); Merchant Shipping Act, i894, sec. 633. When a pilot takes
charge of a vessel the master is not relieved from all liability. He must see
that the pilot's orders are obeyed and that a good lookout is kept. Abbott,
op. cit., 3o2. And if the master and the crew are to blame for any act or omission
that contributes to the accident the owners are liable. The Velasquez (1867,
P. C.) I R. i A. C. 494; The Tactician [i9o7, Adm.] p. 244. The master is
placed in the peculiar position that he must not offer too much assistance or
interfere under penalty of forfeiting the defense. Abbott, op. cit., 3o3, 304. The
defense of compulsory pilotage has not been allowed in the United States. The
China (1868, U. S.) 7 Wall. 53; Indra-Line v. Palmetto Phosphate Co. (i16,
C. C.. A. 4th) 239 Fed. 94; cf. Homer-Ramsdell Transportation Co. v. Cie. Gix.
Transatlantique, supra. The theory of the American cases is that the vessel
herself is liable to a lien according to the maritime law and that the doctrines
of common-law agency do not apply. The English rule has been recently
changed by statute. The Pilotage Act, 1913, sec. 15. The statute did not apply
in the instant case as it did not take effect until January 1, i918. The rule
adopted by the statute, which corresponds to the American rule, would seem to
work out the most uniform and satisfactory results.
BILLs AND NoTEs-INDoRsEMENT BY MISTAKEN HOLDER OF THE SAME NAME.-
S. & Co. drew a check payable to H. E. Richards, intending to mail the same to
its client by that name in Oklahoma. By mistake the check was sent to a former
client of the same name in Texas, who cashed it at a Texas bank, which, in
turn, discounted it with the defendant bank. The defendant bank collected pay-
ment from the drawee bank. The plaintiff drawer now sues as assignee of the
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true payee for conversion. Held, that the plaintiff cannot recover. Slattery &
Co. v. National City Bank (1920, N. Y. Mun. Ct.) 64 N. Y. L. J., Dec. 22, 192O,
No. 68.
It is a general rule that no title to a negotiable instrument passes by a forged
indorsement and that the bank or person making the payment does so at its
peril. N. I. L. sec. 23; Munroe v. Stanley (1915) 22o Mass. 438, io7 N. E. io12.
The cases in which the indorsement has been made by a person of the same
name as the true payee, into whose hands the check has fallen, must be dis-
tinguished from the impostor cases, since in the latter type the mistake as to
identity is on the part of the drawer, while in the former the mistake as to
identity originates with the party who purchases or pays the instrument on the
spurious indorsement. See Harmon v. Old Detroit National Bank (1908) 153
Mich. 73, 116 N. W. 617; 17 L. R. A. (IT. s.) 514, note. The indorsement of a
check or draft by one who is not the payee or indorsee but who bears the same
name is clearly a forgery if he knows that he is not the person intended. Russell
v. First National Bank (igi) 2 Ala. App. 342, 56 So. 868; Beattie v. National
Bank (1898) 174 Ill. 571, 51 N. E. 6o2. A drawer nevertheless cannot recover
from the drawee who has paid a check sent by the drawer to a payee of the
same name as the true payee, because as between two innocent parties the one
causing the injury must suffer. Weisberger v. Barberton Savings Bank (1911)
84 Ohio St. 21, 95 N. E. 379. Nor will a recovery be allowed against a savings
bank where its depositor requested that a draft payable in Germany be sent to
him there for the amount of his deposits, and where such draft was received
and indorsed by and paid to a party of the same name by the drawee, the bank
having a rule that deposits will be paid only over its counter. Jung v. Second
Ward Bank (i882) 55 Wis. 364, 13 N. W. 235. But it has been held that the
drawee bank may recover against the indorsee of the false payee immediately
upon discovering that there has been a forgery. Third National Bank v. Mer-
chants Bank (1894, Sup. Ct.) 76 Hun, 475, 27 N. Y. Supp. 107O; Beattie v.
National Bank, supra. And where -the true payee sued an indorsee of a per-
son having the same name as the payee, thl court allowed a recovery by the
plaintiff, and likewise where the assignee of the true payee brought suit against
the drawee bank which had paid a draft to a bona fide purchaser from a per-
son having the same name as the payee. Indiana National Bank v. Hottsclaw
(1884) 98 Ind. 85; Graves v. American Exchange Bank (858) 17 N. Y. 205.
Where the owner of a bond delivered it merely for safekeeping to a bailee of
identically the same name, an indorsement and delivery of the bond by the bailee
to the plaintiff for value was inoperative against the owner. People's Trust Co.
v. Smith (1915) 215 N. Y. 488, iog N. E. 561. Where the payee of a draft sued
the indorsee of a person having the same name as the payee, a state of facts
similar to the instant case in all respects except that the true payee was suing
instead of his assignee, the court permitted the plaintiff to recover. Thomas v.
First National Bank (1912) IOI Miss. 500, 58-So. 478. In view of what has been
said above it would seem that upon authority the principal case is not sound.
CARRIERS-BILLS OF LADING--DELIVERY OF GooDs WITHOUT SURRENDER OF BILL
oF LADING.-The plaintiff shipped a carload of potatoes to Louisville, Ky., by the
defendant railroad on an "order notify" bill of lading. The bill of lading,
endorsed in bank by the plaintiff consignor, was attached to a draft, discounted
at the plaintiff's bank, and forwarded to the vendee's bank, which wrongfully
delivered it to the vendee without receiving payment of the draft. An agent
of the vendee, having the bill in his possession, telephoned the defendant's agent
at Louisville to deliver the car to the Southern Railroad to be taken to Dumesnil,
Ky., which it did without demanding surrender of the bill. The potatoes, being
unsatisfactory, were rejected at the latter place and the bill of lading was
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returned to the bank. The plaintiff accepted a return of the bill of lading and
the draft, sold the potatoes at a loss; and sought to hold the defendant liable
for the difference between the contract and the selling price. Held, that the
defendant was not liable. Pere Marquette Ry. v. French (1921) 41 Sup. Ct. 195.
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Uniform Bills of Lading Act, 39 U. S.
Stat. at L. 538, ch. 415, it was the general view that the requirement that the bill
of lading be surrendered upon delivery of the goods was primarily for the pro-
tection of the carrier. Famous Mfg. Co. v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. (1914)
166 Iowa, 361, 147 N. W. 754; Nelson Grain Co. v. Railroad Co. (1913) 174 Mich.
80, 14o N. W. 486. Congress, however, in this Act, had in view the protection of
holders who may have made advances upon the bill of lading as security. See
Matter of Bills of Lading (i9o8) 14 I. C. C. Rep. 346. The evident result of
this legislation has been to deprive the carrier of the power, which it formerly
had, to terminate its duty to the consignor by merely making delivery to the
consignee, whether he was in possession of the bill or not. The decision by
the Michigan court, construing the federal Act in the instant case, seems to go
the length of making the carrier liable to the consignor for the mere failure to
take up the bill of lading, though the person to whom delivery is made has it in
his possession at the time. French v. Pere Marquette Ry. (1918) 2o4 Mich. 578,
171 N. W. 491. The protection intended to be extended by the Act does not
require this holding. Furthermore the carrier is justified in making delivery to
a person in possession of a bill properly indorsed, as in the instant case. 39 U. S.
Stat. at L. 54o, sec. 9. Of course, if the carrier makes delivery to a consignee
who has not possession of the bill of lading, it is liable, because under the Act
it has not performed its contract. Babbitt v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. (1918)
285 IIl. 267, i2o N. E. 8o3; Turnbull v. Michigan Central Ry. (igr4) 183 Mich.
213, 15o N. W. 132. The right of action against the carrier, however, will exist
only in favor of a bona fide purchaser. 39 U. S. Stat. at L. 540, sec. iI. As was
pointed out in the instant case the plaintiff, when it took back the bill of lading,
knew all the facts. The decision is clearly correct and distinctly defines the
duties of the carrier under the sections of 1he Act involved.
CONTRACTs-LEGALITY OF AGREEMENTS By BUYERS NOT TO BID AGAINST EACH
OTHER AT A PUBLIC AucrioN-The plaintiff and defendant agreed that they
would not bid against each other at a public auction of government stores, in
order to keep down the price and to share the profits to be realized by a resale
of the goods. The defendant accordingly purchased the articles but repudiated
the agreement and the plaintiff brought a bill for an account with damages. The
lower court found that as a result of this combination the goods were sold for
much less than they would have been had competition been free. Held, that the
plaintiff was entitled to an account, since the contract was not illegal or against
public .policy. Scrutton, L. J., disscnting. Rawlings v. General Trading Co.
(192o, C. A.) 37 T. L. R. 252.
The instant case shows the divergence of judicial opinion between the United
States and England regarding public bidding. In the United States the general
rule is that any agreement whereby bidding is checked or stifled at an auction
sale of either private or public property, is illegal. Doolin v. Ward (18io, N. Y.
Sup. Ct.) 6 Johns. 194; Fletcher v. Johnson (19o5) 139 Mich. 51, IO2 N. W. 278.
Similarly, where contracts for the construction of public or private works are let
upon bids, agreements which in their necessary operation tend to restrain natural
rivalry and competition among prospective contractors, are held to be against
public policy and void. McMullen v. Hoffman (1899) 174 U. S. 639, I9 Sup. Ct.
839; Pitts. Dredging Co. v. Monongahela Co. (19o5, C. C. W. D. Pa.) 139 Fed.
78o. Especially is this rule applied to agreements affecting judicial sales and
government sales and lettings. Jones v. Caswell (i8o2, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 3 Johns.
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29; Kuhn v. Bul (1916) 251 Pa. 348, 96 Atl 977; 42 L. R. A. (N. s.) ir98,
note. These principles have generally not been applied to private sales not at
public auction. Morrison v. Darling (1874) 47 Vt. 67; White.v. McMath (913)
127 Tenn. 713, 156 S. W. 4o. Yet there are a few decisions which have so extended
them. Kincheloe v. Taylor (I918) 123 Va. 178, 96 S. E. i67; Boyle v. Adams
(1892) 50 Minn. 255, 52 N. W. 86o. The latter case is perhaps justifiable on the
ground that public property was involved. The growing tendency, however, has
been to inquire into the intent and purpose of the parties and to uphold the
agreement or combination whenever its object is not to stifle or paralyze compe-
fition. The agreement, therefore, will be upheld where it is entered into solely
to -make the purchase possible, or to protect an interest or effect a bona fide
partnership. Smith v. Ullmann (188i) 58 Md. 183 (to make the purchase pos-
sible) ; Hopkins v. Ensign (i89o) .122 N.* Y. 144, 25 N. E. 306 (to protect an
interest); Hegness v. Chilberg (1p15, C. C. A. 9th) 224 Fed 28 (to effect a
bona fide partnership). The principal case is doubtless in accord with the English
authorities. Heifer v. Martyn (1867) 36 L. J. Ch. 372; Leopard v. Litoun
(1897, Q. B.) 41 Sol. Jo. 545. But considering the nature of the sale, the pur-
pose of the agreement and its effect, .the dissenting opinion would seem to be
sounder, and certainly it is in accord with the American decisions.
CoNFLicr OF LAws-DoMICIL OF A MARRIED WoMTAN.-A Scotswoman married
a Scotsman" while both were dorhiciled in Scotland. In 1893 the husband emi-
grated to Australia at the instance of his wife, and ceased to communicate
with her. In 19o2 he went through the form of marriage with another woman
and lived with her until his death in Queensland in x918. The wife commenced
divorce proceedings in Scotland, but died in 1915 before a decree was secured.
The Commissioners of Internal Revenue brought this action to subject her estate
to legacy duties, on the theory that her domicil was in Scotland. The Lord
Ordinary held that the husband had a domicil in Queensland but that the wife's
domicil remained in Scotland. The Court of Session, by a majority, held that
the wife's domicil was in Queensland, Held, that the wife's domicil was in
Queensland. Lord Advocate v. Jaifrey [192i, H. L.] A. C. 146.
The American courts have followed a far more liberal rule than the English
doctrine. Where the husband has given cause for divorce, all courts of the
United States allow the wife to establish a domicil for the purpose of divorce,
wherever she wishes. Ditson v. Ditson (x856) 4 R. L'87; Beale, Domicile of a
Married Woman (1917) 2 So. L. Q. 93, ioi; but see Burtis v, Burtis (1894)
16i Mass. 508, 37 N. E. 740. There has been a growing. tendency to allow a
wife who has grounds for divorce to obtain a domicil for other purposes. Buch-
holz v. Buchholz (Ii) 63 Wash. 213, 115 Pac. 88 (letters of administration);
Watertown v. Greaves (i9oi, C. C. A. ist) I2 Fed. 183 (purposes of jurisdic-
tion) ; Shute v. Sargent (1893) 67 N. H. 305, 36 Atl. 282 (probate); contra,
Estate of Wickes (igoo) 128 Calif. 27o, 6o Pac. 867. These cases have been
criticised on the ground that the family is still the fundamental unit of our
legal civilization and it must have one definite domicil. Beale, Domicile of a
Married Woman, supra. The husband's privilege of fixing the family domicil
rests upon his duity to support his family. In re Bushby (i9o8, Surro.) 59 Misc.
317, i12 N. Y. Supp. 262. When he fails to fulfil his matrimonial duties, the
reason for his privilege fails. And under the present emancipation of woman,
since she is sui juris, and can have dealings with others, she should be directly
amenable to the law and hence should have a legal home of her own. Levitt,
Domicile of a Married Woman (1920) 91 CENT. L. J. 24, 28. The interests of
the state are not served by depriving a wronged wife of the privilege of estab-
lishing a legal domicil. As a practical matter, knowledge that she cannot have
a separate legal domicil will not in the least deter her from leaving her husband
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and breaking up the family entity if she wishes to. Some cases in the United
States have allowed a married woman to obtain separate domicil even where
the husband has given no ground for divorce. Chapman v. Chapman (1889) 129
Ill. 386, 21 LN. E. 8o6; Buchholz v. Buchholz, supra; Saperstone v. Saperstone
(1911, Sup. Ct.) 73 Misc. 631, 1.31 N. Y. Supp. 24!; contra, In re Bushby, supra;
Cheely v. Clayton (884) 110 U.-S. 701, 4 Sup. Ct. 328. It is submitted that the
wife should not be allowed to benefit by her own wrong and that the grounds
of policy for allowing a separate domicil do not apply where the husband has
not given cause for divorce or legal separation. England does not, in general,
allow a separate domicil to a married woman even for divorce proceedings.
Dolphin v. Robins (1859) 7 H. L. Cas. 390. The instant case is in accord with
the less liberal English rule.
CoNTR~crs-REsTRAINT OF TRADE-RESTRAINT ON ALIENATION OF PROPERTr
MANUFACTURED UNDER SECRET PRocEss.-This suit was brought to restrain the
Coca-Cola Co. and the Coca-Cola Bottling Co. from executing contracts alleged
to be within the anti-trust laws of the state. By the contracts the Coca-Cola Co.
granted the privilege of bottling to the Bottling Co., the latter agreeing to buy
all their syrups from the Coca-Cola Co. and not to resell the syrup thus bought.
Held, that the contract, by restraining the resale of the syrups, merely restricted
the grantee in the exercise of a privilege, and.was therefore valid. Coca-Cola
Co. v. State (ig2o, Tex.) 225 S. W. 791.
In general, restraints on alienation are considered void. Park & Sons Co. v.
Hartman (i907, C. C. A. 6th) 153 Fed. 24. But where the restraint is found
to be reasonable, with respect both to the public and to the contracting parties,
and is limited to what is fairly necessary to the protection of the covenantee, it
will be sustained. Ford-Motor Co. v. Boone (1917, C. C. A. 9th) 244 Fed. 335; cf.
Continental Candy Corp v. Calif. Sugar Co. (Dec. 28, 192o) U. S. D. C. S.D. Calif.
No. 579. * It cannot, however, be upheld solely because the article sold is manu-
factured under a patent or secret process. Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co.
0916) 243 U. S. 490, 37 Sup. Ct. 412. A patent does not confer upon the
patentee the right to self or use the patented article; he has these rights without
a patent. He only gets a right to exclude others from using his invention or
discovery. See Munson, Control of Patented and Copyrighted Articles after
Sale (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 270, 272. When title to the chattels is passed
by the patentee, they are no longer subject to the patent monopoly. Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film A'ffg. Co. (1916) 243 U. S. 502, 37 Sup.
Ct. 416. Most of the cases holding restraints on alienation to be invalid
do so on the theory that they have for their purpose the destruction of com-
petition. Hill Co. v. Gray & Worcester (1go) 163 Mich. 12, 127 N. W. 803.
Other cases go on the theory that a free right of alienation is an incident to the
general right of property in articles which pass from hand to hand in commerce.
See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co. (i908, C. C. A. 6th) 164 Fed.
803, 8o6. The latter rule is based upon public policy and if a transaction does
not infringe the policy which the rule carries out, then it is not illegal. See
Kales, Contracts and Combinations in Restraint of Trade (1918) sec. 35. The
principal case, not being one where competition was restricted, comes within the
last class of cases. As there was no public demand for the syrup, as such, and
as no one but the licensee of the defendant could bottle the beverage, it was a
contract protecting the rights retained by the covenantee and the restraint seems
reasonable and not against public policy. The reasoning of the court, that the
restraiht on the resale of the article was a restriction on the exercise of a
privilege that was granted, seems faulty. Though the restriction as to the resale
was imposed before the syrup was sold by the defendant and at .the time when
the privilege was granted, it attached to the article and was in effect a restraint
on the alienation of the article itself.
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CORPoA TIONS-POWER OF MAJORrrY STOCKHOLDERS TO SELL ENTR PROPERTY
FOR STocx--The Alice Company, being without reasonable prospects of making
a profit, agreed to convey its property to the Anaconda Company, receiving stock
of the latter in return, and after ratification by a majority of the stockholders,
carried out the agreement. A majority of the stockholders having voted to dis-
solve, the minority stockholders brought this action to set aside the sale to the
Anaconda Company and to enjoin the dissolution. Held, that the majority
stockholders had the power to sell the property for stock, but the sale should be
set aside because of the inadequacy of the price. Geddes v. Anaconda Mining Co.
(92) 41 Sup. Ct. 209.
The instant case raises two questions: (i) can the majority stockholders sell
all the property of a corporation for stock, and (2) can they force this stock on
the dissenting stockholders? To answer the first question we must decide
whether the corporation has the power to take stock and whether the majority
can exercise such power. Without statutory authority, or charter authority, a
corporation can not hold stock in another corporation. Riker v. United Drug
Co. (19,1) 79 N. J. Eq. 580, 82 Atl. 93o. An exception has been suggested where
the corporation is about to dissolve and distribute this stock. Treadwell v.
Salisbury Co. (I856, Mass.) 7 Gray, 393; see Byrne v. Schuyler Co. (895) 65
Conn. 336, 342, 31 Atl. 833, 836. But even where a corporation has the power,
as is generally the case, can it be exercised by the majority? The cases which
deny this authority are generally cases where the majority could not sell all the
property for cash, because the concern was prosperous. Elyton Land Co. v.
Dowdell (i896) 113 Ala. 177, 20 So. 981; People v. Ballard (1892) 134 N. Y.
269, 32 N. E. 54. It would seem that where the corporation can take stock, the
majority can sell for stock in the same circumstances that they can sell for cash:
namely, when the company is not prospering. Bowditclh v. Jackson Co. (i912)
76 N. H. 351, 82 AtI. Io4; Metcalf v. Am. School Furniture Co. (19o3, C. C.
W. D. N. Y.) 122 Fed. 115. After the corporation has this stock, the second
question is whether the majority stockholders can force it on the dissenting
minority? The practically universal answer is that they can not. Winfree v.
Riverside Cotton Mills (1912) 113 Va. 717, 75 S. E. 309; contra, Mayfield v.
Alton Ry. (19o2) 198 Ill. 528, 65 N. E. ioo. To allow such action would be
to change a stockholder's investment without his consent. But the denial of
this power should not affect our answer above to the first question, for the
corporation's acquisition of stock and the distribution of this stock are totally
separate. Butler v. New Keystone Copper Co. (915) io Del. Ch. 37
r
, 93 Atl.
38o; Logie v. Copper Mines (191o). io6 Wash. 2o8, 179 Pac. 835. It is merely
necessary to arrange to give cash to the dissenters. Slattery v. New Orleans
Co. (1911) 128 La. 871, 55 So. 558; Jackson v. Gardiner Co. (1914, C. C. A. ist)
217 Fed. 350. Some courts have gone farther and granted a decree setting aside
the sale of the property unless cash is paid to the minority holders within a
stated time. Koehler v. Brewbig Co. (igio) 228 Pa. 648, 77 Atl. ioi6; cf.
Mason v. Mining Co. (188) 133 U. S. 50, 10 Sup. Ct. 24. Statutes may provide
for the appraisal of the stock of dissenters. Cf. In re Rowe (1919, Sup. Ct.)
1o7 Misc. 549, 176 N. Y. Supp. 753. A suggestion has been made that where
the stock is the equivalent of cash, the dissenters can not refuse it. See Koehler
v. Brewing Co., supra. In the instant case the court adopted this suggestion.
The decision might also be justified on the ground that the right of the dissent-
ing stockholders to cash does not affect the power of the corporation to sell its
property for stock. Inevitably, as in the instant case, this question is bound up
with the question as to whether a fair price has been secured; its answer does
not determine the existence of the power, but only shows whether it has been
exercised properly.
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PRACTicE-EQUITABLE CoUNTERCIAIm TO LEGAL AcTIoN-SEPARArE AND PRIOR
TImAL OF IssuEs RAsED.--The plaintiff smed the defendant for wrongful dis-
charge before the expiration of a contract to employ him for three years. The
defendant pleaded, in addition to a general denial, an equitable counterclaim
asking for specific performance of a contract which obligated the plaintiff to
sell his stock in the defendant corporation to it in severing relations with it.
The defendant moved for the separate trial at Special Term of the issues raised
by his counterclaim and for a stay of the trial of the other issues in the meantime.
Held, that the motion for- a separate trial on the equitable counterclaim should
be granted, and the latter should be stayed until the trial of the legal issues.
Reilly v. Guttnman Silks Corporation (i92o, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 113 Misc. 502.
There seems to be quite a conflict as to the order of trial of the issues raised
by an equitable counterclaim to a legal action. The courts in some of the states
hold that the issues raised in the equitable counterclaim should be tried first.
Cotton v. Butterfield and Demaris (i9o5) 14 N. D. 465, 1O5 N. W. 236; Pen-
ninger Co. Ltd. v. Clark (1912) 22 Idaho 397, 126 Pac. 524. The rule in the
federal courts is to the same effect. Union Pacific Ry. v. Syas (1917, C. C. A.
8th) 246 Fed. 561; Fay v. Hill (ig8, C. C. A. 8th) 249 Fed. 415. The only
reason given by these courts is that the determination of the equitable issues in
favor of the defendant would put an end to the litigation and obviate the neces-
sity of trying the legal issues -involved. Swasey v. Adair (i8g) 88 Calif. 179,
23 Pac. 284; 7 Encyc. of P1. & Pr. 8io. But it is conceivable that the determina-
tion of the equitable issues may not in some cases put an end to the litigation;
and then this reason would fail. Other courts leave it to the discretion of the
trial court as to whether the issues on the equitable counterclaim should be tried
first. Cacavallo v. D'Elia (1918) 93 Conn. 116, io5 Atl. 348; Crosby v. Scott-
Graff Lumber Co. (19o4) 93 Minn. 475, ioi N. W. 61o. It has recently been held
that the court abused its discretion in deciding the legal issues as to the plaintiff's
title before disposing of the equitable defense of bona fide purchase. Oliver v.
McWhirter (1918) 112 S. C. 555, 96 S. E. i4o. In the lower New York courts
there is a conflict on this point. In one case it was held that since the equitable
counterclaim would be heard first anyway, it was not necessary to stay the legal
proceedings. Thomas v. The Bronx Realty Co. (igoi) 6o App. Div. 365, 70 N. Y.
Supp. 2o6. Other courts hold that the defendant must make a motion to have
such a counterclaim tried first before attempting to place the case on the calendar.
Brody, Adler, & Koch Co. v. Hochstadter (1912) I5o App. Div. 527, 135 N. Y.
Supp. 549; New York v. Matthews (1913) 156 App. Div. 490, 141 N. Y. Supp.
432. The New York Court of Appeals has held with the instant case and other
cases in lower New York courts, that where the facts constituting the equitable
counterclaim are also a defense to the legal action, the issues on the counterclaim
do not have to be tried first. Bentnett v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co. (Igoo)
164 N. Y. 131, 58 N. E. 7; Loewenthal v. Haines (1914) I6o App. Div. 5o3, 145
N. Y. Supp. 579; contra, Goss v. Goss & Co. (1908) 126 App. Div. 748, 111 N. Y.
Supp. 115. The best rule seems to be the one that makes it discretionary 'with
the court. This discretion should be based upon the facts and circumstances of
each case as well as upon .the condition of the calendar.
PRACTICE-LEGAL COUNTERCLAIM I1 AN EQUITABLE AcTION-JURY TRIAL A
MATTER OF RIGHT.-The plaintiff sued in equity for the recovery of capital stock
in the defendant corporation, to which the plaintiff claimed to be entitled by
virtue of an agreement whereby the plaintiff agreed to make certain payments
and deliver to the defendants certain machinery and to assign to them exclusive
patent rights. The plaintiff alleged complete performance on his part, which
entitled him to receive 6oo shares, of which only. 51o were delivered; and this
suit was brought to compel the delivery of the balance and to restrain the
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defendant from transferring it to anybody else during the pendency of the action.
The defendant put in a general denial and also a legal counterclaim for $25,oo0
damages for non-delivery of certain of the machines. The defendant moved for
a jury trial on his counterclaim as a matter of right. Held (Smith, J., dissent-
ing) that the defendant is entitled as a matter of right to have the legal issues
raised by the counterclaim settled by a jury. Maag v. Maag Gear Co. (1920)
193 App. Div. 759, 184 N. Y. Supp. 63o.
The law seems settled that a defendant by setting up a legal counterclaim to an
action in equity cannot change the whole action into a legal one and obtain thereby
a trial by jury on all the issues. Lord Kinnaird v. Field [i9o5] 2 Ch. 361; Angus
v. Craven (igoI) 132 Calif. 691, 64 Pac. io91. The courts of some states hold
that where the defendant pleads a legal counterclaim to an equitable cause of
action he is not entitled to a jury trial on the counterclaim as a matter of right.
Johnson Service Co. %, Kruse (1913) 121 Minn. 28, I40 N. W. IIS; Larkin v.
Wilson (1882) 2 Kan. 513. And the constitutional provision that the right of
trial by jury shall remain inviolate does not prevent this result. Johnson v.
Peterson (i903) go Minn. 503, 97 N. W. 384; Peters v. Duluth (i912) iig Minn.
96, 137 N. W. 39o. The instant case in holding that the defendant is entitled to
a jury trial as a matter of right is in conflict with an earlier New York decision
by the Court of Appeals, which held that in such a case the right was waived.
Mackellar v Rogers (1888) io9 N. Y. 468, I7 N. E. 350; i9 Encyc. of Pl. and Pr.
799, note. For a brief discussion of the. scope of counterclaims see (192i) .21
COL. L. Rv. I96; (i92i) 5 MINN. L. REV. 307.
PROPERTY-RIGHTS WITH RESPECT TO DEAD BoDiEs.-The plaintiff, who was the
next of kin of the defendant's deceased husband, had buried the body in a family
plot. There was evidence that the defendant, although ill at the time, had con-
sented to the manner and place of burial. Thereafter the defendant was about to
disinter and remove her husband's body to a place chosen by her. The plaintiff
filed a bill for an injunction. Held, that an injunction should issue, since the
defendant had waived her right to the control of her husband's body for purposes
of burial. Stiles v. Stiles (ig2o, Sup. Ct.) I13 Misc. 576, 185 N. Y. Supp. 53.
The early common law recognized no rights with respect to dead bodies; they
were exclusively within the jurisdiction of the church and ecclesiastical courts.
See Reg. v. Sharpe (1857, Cr. App.) Dearsly & B. i6o; 3 Coke, Inst 203. There
is no property in dead bodies; they are not subject to a lien; nor will replevin
lie for them. Amer. Express Co. v. Epply (1876) 5 Ohio. Dec. 337; Keyes v.
Konkel (1899) ii9 Mich. 550, 78 N. W. 649. However, the law has always
recognized a duty to bury the dead. This duty is usually cast successively upon
the executor, surviving spouse, next of kin, and the person under whose roof the
deeased died. See Pierce v. Proprietors (1872) 1o R. I. 227, 235; Williams V.
Williams (1882) L. R. 20 CI. Div. 659, 664. Althofigh there-is no property in
dead bodies, it is recognized that the relatives of a deceased person have a right
that third persons shall not mutilate or otherwise maltreat the body. Larson v.
Chase (189I) 47 Minn. 307, 5o N. W. 238; Floyd v. A. C. L. Ry. (1914) 167 N. C.
55, 83 S. E. 12. Relatives also have a right under certain circumstances that the
body shall not be disinterred. Gardner v. Swan Cemetery (1898) 20 R. L 646,
40 Atl. 871; Litteral v. Litteral (i9o8) 131 Mo. App. 3o6, iii S. W. 872. The
exercise of the so-called right of control over a dead body, in preference to
others, is subject to the supervision of courts of equity. See Larson v. Chase,
supra; Pettigrew v. Pettigrew (1904) 2o7 Pa. 313,.319, 56 Atl. 878, 88o. Under
certain circumstances the surviving spouse, who is usually preferred, will not be
permitted to control the body as against the next of kin. Wood v. Butterworth
(1911) 65 Wash. 344, ii8 Pac. 212. Under other circumstances, the privilege
will be refused the relatives and granted to a stranger in blood. Scott v. Riley
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(1883, Pa. C. P.) x6 Phila. io6; see O'Donnell v. Slach (1899) 123 Calif. 285,
55 Pac. 9o6. In at least one case the court has denied it altogether and ordered
the body to be buried under the decree and direction of the court. De Festetics v.
De Festetics (I911) 79 N. J. Eq. 488, 8I At. 741. In some states custody and
control of the dead body is granted and regulated by statute. See Conn. Gen. St.
1902, sec. 363; S'zits v. Swits (igog) 81 Conn. 598, 71 Adi. 782. Since the defen-
dant in the instant case had waived the right which the court recognizes she had
to control the disposition of her husband's body, the intervention of equity to
prevent disinterment seems proper. Cf. Snyder v. Snyder (i88o, N. Y. Sup. Ct.)
6o How. Pr. 368.
TAXATION-FEDERAL CORPORATION TAx-DEDucroN OF INTEREST LIMITED TO
PAR VALUE OF PAID-UP CAPITAL.-Section 38 of the Federal Corporation Excise
Tax Law of i9o9 permitted a deduction from the corporation's gross income of
"interest actually paid within the year on its bonded or other indebtedness not
exceeding the paid up capital stock of such corporation." The defendant corpora-
tion had sold a considerable number of shares at prices above par. In making up
its tax returns the corporation deducted interest upon the entire amount paid for
the shares. The United States claimed the deductions should be limited to interest
upon the par value of the stock, and sued for the balance of the tax assessed on
this basis. Held, that the plaintiff should recover. New York, N. H. & H. Ry.
v. United States (Nov. II, ig2o) U. S. C. C. A. 2d, Oct. Term, 192O, No. 3o.
The defendant claimed that Congress -intended by "paid up capital stock" the
sum actually paid in by the stockholders, and that any other interpretation of
the act would make it void as denying equal protection of the laws. But the
court rejected this interpretationi and laid stress upon the words "not exceeding
the paid-up capital stock" as showing the congressional intent to iimit "capital
stock" to the par value of the shares. The excess over par paid for shares is
regarded as a premium by business men generally. It was first entered in the
defendant's books in its profits and loss account, and -the sums were used as if
surplus. In the construction of tax laws, words are usually to be interpreted in
their popular sense. See American Pig-Iron Storage Co. v. State Board of
Assessors. (1894, Sup. Ct.) 56 N. J. L. 389, 394, 29 Atd. i6o, 161. It seems clear
that in the principal case the legislative intent has been properly interpreted. Cf.
B. & 11f. Ry. v. United States (192o, C. C. A. ist) 265 Fed. 578. A resulting
apparent inequality, however, is that while the defendant may not make the
deduction, another corporation might do so even though similarly circumstanced
in every respect except that its shares were of no par value. But assuming that
Congress intended to impose the tax in this manner, the Act should not be held
unconstitutional. Cf. Union Tanning Co. v. Commonwealth (1918) 123 Va. 61o,
96 S. E. 780; Greene v. Louisville & Interurban Ry. (1917) 244 U. S. 499, 37
Sup. Ct. 673. It is in the result but not in the method of imposition that the tax
is unequal and possibly unjust. As the tax involved was laid under the 19o9 law,
the case is of interest chiefly as showing an additional advantage of stock without
par value. The advantage does not exist under the present law, however. Under
the 1918 Federal Income Tax Law, sec. 214, all interest paid on indebtedness is
deductible. Montgomery, Income Tax Procedure (192o) 585; Holmes, Federal
Taxes (1920) 855.
TAXATION-FEDERAL CORPORATION TAx-UNREASONABLE SALARY DEDUCTIBLE IN
DETERMINING TAXABLE INCOME.-The United States brougnt suit to recover from
the defendant corporation an additional income tax, on the theory that the salary
paid to its president, which it had used as a deductible item in determining its
taxable income, was unreasonably disproportionate to the value of his services
and hence an improper deduction. Held, that the plaintiff should suffer a non-
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suit, since the corporation's privilege of deducting an officer's salary depends not
on the reasonableness but on the bona fides of the salary. United States v.
Phila. Knitting Mills Co. (i92o, E. D. Pa.) 268 Fed. 27o.
The opinion does not indicate what years' taxes were in dispute, but it. appears
from a newspaper comment on the decision that the taxes* in question were for
the years 19o9-I912. The Corporation Tax Act of igog permitted deduction from
gross income of "all the ordinary and necessary expenses actually paid within
the year" in the operation of the corporation's business. 36 Stat. at L. 113.
Substantially the same phraseology was continued in the Income Tax Act of
1913 and of 1916; no express reference being made to salaries. 38 id. 172; 39 
id.
759, 767. Under these Acts the problem is whether the employer may 
determine
for himself the necessity of the expense with respect to a given salary, or
whether the question of what was an ordinary and necessary expenditure for
services shall be submitted to a jury. The principal case is believed to be sound
within the limits of good faith. A mere error of judgment or undue liberality
to an employee ought not to deprive the employer of the privilege of deducting.
When the name of compensation for services is used really as a cloak to cover
a distribution of profits or income, the-deduction cannot stand. Jacob & Davies,
Inc. v. Anderson (1915, C. C. A. 2d) 228 Fed. 5o5. The Revenue Act of 1918
expressly includes among deductible expenses "a reasonable allowance for
salaries." Secs. 214 (a), 234 (a). Possibly this phrase gives the taxing officials
power to review excessive salaries paid by a tax payer even though no mala fides
is involved. Of course Congress may, if it chooses, limit deductions in respect
to salaries to fair compensation for services rendered. The Treasury Regulations
assume that it has done so. U. S. Int. Rev. Reg. 45, art. IO5, io6; see Holmes,
Federal Income and Profits Taxes (1920) 347, and 1921 Suppplement, 22o. No
known judicial determination of the question has yet been rendered.
WILLs-CoNsTRUcTION OF "LAPs."-The testator's will provided that the resi-
duum should go to four relatives in equal shares, and that in case any of them
should die before the testator, his portion should "lapse." A statute declared
that upon the death of any relative legatee before the testator, his share should
go to his lineal descendants. One of the legatees having predeceased the testator,
this bill was brought by the administrator for a construction of the will and an
order determining the devolution of the share of the deceased relative. Held,
that the will created a tenancy-in-common and hence no right of survivorship,
with a dictum that the use of the word "lapse" prevented the application of the
above statute to the disputed legacy and made it intestate property. Hay v. Dole
(1920, Me.) iii Atl. 713.
At common law, if a residuary legatee dies before the testator, his legacy is
said to lapse, going to the heirs of the testator. Stetson v. Eastman (1892) 84
Me. 366, 24 Atl. 868; see Farnsworth v. Whiting (i9o6) iO2 Me. 296, 3oo, 66 At.
831, 832. It would seem then that -the testator in the instant case has merely
expressed what the law would imply anyway. But the statute involved in the
case has changed the, common-law rule, so that when a legacy to a relative lapses,
it goes to the lineal descendants of the relative and not to the heirs of the testator.
Rev. St. d ie 9o3, ch. 76, sec. io. Hence in the absence of a clear intention to
the contrary, the lineal descendants of the deceased legatee in the instant case,
if any, should take such an interest as would have been taken by the deceased
legatee. See Keniston t. Adams (1888) 8o Me. 290, 294, 14 Atl. 203, 2o4. The
express declaration by the testator of the common-law rule would scarcely seem
under the circumstances to afford evidence of such an intention. But even
assuming that there is a clear intention to the contrary, it would seem very
doubtful whether it should be given effect in view of the fact that the statute
is based on public policy. See Winter v. Winter (1846, Ch.) 5 Hare, 3o6, 312;
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see Nutter v. Vickery (1874) 64 Me. 490, 498. Although the dictum in the instant.
case is questionaable, the decision that the surviving legatees take as tenants-in-
common and that as far as they are concerned the heirs of the testator prevail,
is undoubtedly sound. Magnuson v'. Magnuson (1902) 197 Ill. 496, 64 N. E. 371;
see Herzog v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co. (I9O3) 177 N. Y. 86, 93, 69 N. E.
283, 285.
WILLS-SoLDIERS' WILT.s-REvocATION OF FORMAL WILL BY UNATTESTE WRIT-
iNG.-The testator, a soldier in the English army, made a formal will leaving
property to his fiancee. He then was sent into active service. Later, because
of certain information received by him, he broke off the engagement, and wrote
to his sister, who had the will, instructing her to burn it, which she did. The
testator died in service. After his death an unattested copy of the destroyed will
was found. Held, that the will had been effectually revoked by the letter. Wood
v. Gossage (19I2, C. A.) 37 T. L. R. 302.
The English Wills Act provides that a will may be revoked "by another will
or codicil executed in manner hereinbefore required, or by some writing declar-
ing an intention to revoke the same, and executed in the manner in which a will
is hereinbefore required to be executed." Wills Act, 1837 (1 Vict. C. 26) sec. 2o.
A writing, therefore, is usually inoperative as a revocation, unless signed by the
testator, and attested by two witnesses, as required for the validity of a will.
Wills Act, supra, sec. 9; Toomer v. Sobinska [19o7] P. io6. But a soldier in
actual military service is exempt from these requirements in the execution of a
will disposing of personalty. Wills Act. supra, sec. ii; see COMMENTS (IgI8)
27 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 8o6.. So an informal soldier's will may be probated with
a prior formal will. Winter z. Pawle (1918, P.) 34 T. L. R. 437. And an informal
soldier's will revokes a prior inconsistent formal will, except as to real estate.
Nixon v. Prince (1918) 34 T. L. R. 444. Similarly, in Virginia, a holographic
will revokes a prior inconsistent formal will. Gordon v. Whitlock (896) 92 Va.
723, 24 S. E. 342. The court int the instant case construes secs. ii and 20 of the
Wills Act to mean that, since no formalities are required for the executioh of a
soldier's will, none are required for its revocation. That a soldier should have
the same privilege in revoking as in executing a will seems a just exception to
the usual modern requirements for revocation. The decision obviously carries
out the intention of the testator.
